

Entering the Mountains to Rule the Aborigines: Taiwanese Aborigine Education and the Colonial Encounter

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INTRODUCTION

Just as Native American education policy in post-Civil War United States was shaped by the thirst for land during a period of rapid westward expansion (Adams 1988: 1), so too was Aborigine² education policy in Taiwan shaped by the forces which drew first the Qing, and later the Japanese into the rugged terrain of the high Central Mountain Range (*Zhongyang Shanmai* 中央山脈) and the remote plains of the East Coast. Education policy was central to U.S. territorial expansion because "the willingness of Indians to sell their land" was assumed to be "directly proportionate to their ability to acquire civilized ways" (Adams 1988: 16). Whereas in the U.S. case these "civilized ways" were defined in terms Protestant ideology and an agricultural lifestyle, during the late Qing dynasty Confucianism and wet paddy rice farming served a similar purpose. The civilizing mission was no less central during Japanese rule, although loyalty to the Emperor replaced Confucianism. While the civilizing mission remained constant throughout the entire period, spanning from 1874 to 1945, there were important differences in implementation which had profound effects on the incorporation of Aborigines into the state. The arrival of the Colonial Japanese Government in 1895 marked an important turning point, bringing a new urgency to the task of occupying the mountain territories. And the start of the Sino-Japanese War of 1937 created a need for loyal subjects willing to die for the Emperor. Taiwan's unique geography mattered too, with education policies in the Central Range differing from those on the East Coast. Accordingly, this chapter is organized around three time periods: late Qing (1874-1945), prewar (1895-1937) and wartime Japanese rule (1937-1945), with differences in education policy between the Mountains and the East Coast highlighted whenever possible.

Before proceeding, a few words are necessary about a third group of Aborigines not otherwise discussed in this article. The *Pingpu* (*Pingpuzu* 平埔族) or Plains Aborigines of the West Coast were the first to contact the Chinese settlers who began to settle there in large numbers during the seventeenth century (Shepherd 1993: 80). As a result the Pingpu either assimilated or migrated out. During the early years of Japanese rule the last remaining legal differences between Pingpu and Chinese were eliminated. The Pingpu had special legal status as "large-rent" owners in a complex three-tiered system of land ownership divided between "large-rent" owners, "small-rent" owners, and the tenants who actually farmed the land. By the late nineteenth century many Pingpu had already lost all rights to their land in exchange for continued loans from the small-rent holder (Chen 1999: 138-139; Harrell 1990: 117), but those who still held on to their land benefited both from special tax-exemptions as well as continued rents. The tax exemption was removed when Qing governor Liu Mingchuan (劉銘傳) (1836-1896) sought to raise taxes in order to fund his ambitious modernization program (Shepherd 1993: 361). Then, in 1904, the Japanese ended the three-tiered system and eliminated rents to the large-rent holders. As a result, "there was no instrumental reason for the assimilated Pingpus to maintain a separate ethnic identity" (Stainton 1995: 92). The transition was cemented when, in 1915 "race" was abolished as a category in the Japanese household registration system (Brown 2004: 54). And the integration of the two communities was further accelerated by the banning of footbinding in the same year, eliminating a major barrier to Pingpu-Chinese intermarriage (Brown 2004: 56, 95). As a result of these changes the Pingpu ceased to be treated as a distinct ethnic group until the category was revived by identity based political movements in the 1980s (Hsieh 2006: 4). Accordingly, for the purposes of this paper, the phrase "Plains Aborigines" refers not to the Pingpu, but to the Aborigines living on Taiwan's East Coast, both along the coast and in the narrow Rift Valley

(*Huadong Zonggu* 花東縱谷) sandwiched between the high Central Mountain Range and the smaller Coastal Mountain Range (*Haian Shanmai* 海岸山脈) along the East Coast.

THE LAST YEARS OF QING RULE, 1874-1895

Before 1874, most attempts by Chinese to settle in the Rift Valley on the East Coast ended in disaster. Disease and Aborigine hostility ensured that only a few small settlements were able to survive, and these only around the coastal ports of what are now present day Hualian (花蓮) and Taidong (台東). One group of settlers were only able to survive by working as laborers for the Amis (*Ameizu* 阿美族), the most populous Aborigine group living in the Rift Valley (Thorne 1997: 97). All that was changed in 1874, when an international incident brought this remote region to the attention of the top officials of the Qing government. Three years earlier an Okinawan boat had shipwrecked off the shore of Southeast Taiwan. When the sailors came ashore at the Aborigine village of Mudanshe (牡丹社), they came into conflict with the resident Paiwan (*Paiwanzu* 排灣族) Aborigines, who killed 54 sailors. Japan responded by sending a force of 3,000 soldiers to occupy the East Coast of Taiwan, supposedly to punish the Aborigines responsible for the killings, although it is likely that the Japanese were already interested in acquiring a territory that would protect their important trade routes. “Only after China signed a treaty agreeing to compensate both the families of the Okinawan victims for the deaths and Japan for the cost of its military expedition did Japan withdraw its troops at the end of October 1874” (Chou 1991: 13). This was a wake up call, leading to a full scale transformation of Qing policy towards Taiwan as well as towards the Aborigine territories.

Before 1874, the Qing had sought to prevent Aborigine unrest by limiting contact between Chinese and Aborigines. During the early years of Qing rule the local administration, often in response to rebellions, routinely ordered surveys of the boundary

between Han and Aborigine settlement, as well as the construction of earthen walls to mark the limits of permissible Han settlement (Shepherd 1993: 16-18). Each time the surveys simply acknowledged the previous boundary transgressions as a *fait accompli*, and did little to halt future movement across the boundary. Accordingly, when settlers did seek to move into Aborigine territory, they did so without any official support from the state (Harrell 1990: 113). After Mudanshe, however, the Qing adopted a policy of direct military occupation and official support of Han settlement in the Aborigine territories.

With the support of troops from the mainland, the Rift Valley was forcibly opened up. Three overland trails were opened up through the mountains to the West Coast, and garrisons were established in stone forts “to promote settlement in the areas where the roads emerged from the mountains.” Chinese were offered a package of inducements (including draft animals, agricultural implements, and a three year exemption on taxation) to further encourage them to settle in the area (Thorne 1997: 29).

The attempt by the Qing to settle the region was not entirely successful. Over the next twenty years (in 1877, 1878, 1888, and 1895) there were a series of Aborigine uprisings against Qing rule in the Rift Valley. Many of these started with action by one Aborigine village from one ethnic group, but often grew to involve many different Aborigine groups, and even the Hakka. The Qing attempted to reward “compliant” villages by offering them seed and agricultural training. Such villages would appoint a village leader, or *toumu* (頭目), who would be responsible to the state for the behavior of the village, and village men would have to cut their hair in the Qing style. The *toumu* position was new form of political rule imposed by the Qing on all Aborigine villages, regardless of their existing political structures. After suppressing the third rebellion in 1888, which required naval forces to be sent from the mainland, *toumu* from the defeated villages were taken on a tour of the large Han cities of the

East Coast and the mainland in order to impress upon them the power of the Qing, a practice which was to be emulated by the Japanese. By the end of the period the Amis were seen as slowly becoming Sinicized, and were even used to help fight against the Bunun (*Bunongzu* 布農族) and Truku (*Tailugezu* 太魯閣族) who were still raiding from the mountains (Thorne 1997: 111-113).

Tension between the plains dwelling Amis, Paiwan, and Puyuma (*Beinanzu* 卑南族) on the one hand, and the mountain dwelling Bunun and Truku on the other was exacerbated when, in 1885, Taiwan became a full province and was placed under the command of Liu Mingchuan, “an aggressive governor with a military background” (Shepherd 1993: 360). Central to Liu’s rule was a policy of “entering the mountains to rule the aborigines” (Harrell 1990: 118). This policy was similar to the one that had been established a decade earlier in the Rift Valley, in that it used forced military occupation to open up Aborigine territories to settlers. However, it was different in two important respects: First, in addition to Qing military forces, the mountain campaigns also involved local Chinese militias. Liu was thus able to channel the ethnic violence that had riven the increasingly overpopulated immigrant communities on the West Coast against a common enemy.³ Secondly, while early Dutch expeditions had failed to find significant sources of gold⁴ on the East Coast, the camphor trees that grew in Taiwan’s mountains were almost as valuable as gold, containing as they did a key ingredient in the newly invented plastic, celluloid (Stainton 1995: 86), as well as a host of other cosmetic, pharmaceutical, and military uses (it was used as an ingredient in gunpowder) (Richardson 1972: 104). Liu hoped to use the state camphor monopoly to help fund his expensive reforms. “During the years 1891-95 Taiwan exported 30% more camphor than all of the rest of the world” (Thorne 1997: 125). The net effect of Liu’s mountain campaigns was to push the Bunun and Truku Aborigines further into the Rift Valley,

exacerbating tensions between Aborigine groups in the plains and those in the mountains.

When the Qing army forced open the Rift Valley to settlers in the wake of the Mudanshe Incident, they put forth an ambitious proposal to assimilate the Aborigines. An Aborigine who had fully assimilated was referred to by the term *guihua* (歸化), a term which “which at the same time describes the process of enculturation and the status of those being enculturated” (Martin 1994: 47). Assimilation meant education, and plans were made to open forty-four schools on the East Coast, although only seven were ever opened, and most were closed within ten years due to poor attendance. The curriculum at these schools included the 1875 textbook, *Proverbs for the Instruction of Savages* (*Xunfan Liyan* 訓番俚言) and focused on Confucian morality and language instruction. The schools seem to have had some success, for, according to reports at the time, “after two years in these schools the majority of students could speak the Minnan dialect” (Thorne 1997: 114-115).

The emphasis on Confucian morality is consistent with Qing educational policies towards non-Han Chinese peoples living in other border regions. The Qing were concerned about promoting “household proprietorship of agricultural land” which was seen as a basic feature, not only of morality, but also of “civil law” as well as “fiscal accountability” (Rowe 1994: 425). However, public education lacked a steady source of funding. “Rather, periodic campaigns to set up schools were launched either by the few vigorous reforming officials or in reconstruction efforts following major disturbances when lack of education was always identified as contributing to social disorder” (Shepherd 1993: 373). Accordingly, funding for Aborigine schooling was especially forthcoming after major rebellions or after pacifying new territories, such as the East Coast, and it was rarely continued after things had quieted down.

THE EARLY YEARS OF JAPANESE RULE, 1895-1936

It is usual to divide the early years of Japanese rule into two periods, as the transition

from military to civilian rule in 1915 marks a clear shift in colonial policy towards the island (Liao 2006: 2); however, for Taiwan's indigenous populations, the period before 1915 was largely dominated by military confrontation, with the exception of the East Coast, and even there — despite having been colonized by the Qing — it still took some time before the Japanese successfully exerted state control over the area. Early attempts by the Japanese to settle the Rift Valley in 1906 failed, and it took government sponsored development in order to make the region more accessible. By the early thirties, three thousand Japanese had settled into three villages, at a cost to the Japanese government of nearly ¥5,000 per family (at a time when that much money could have bought roughly eight hectares of irrigated paddy land on the East Coast). Much of this expense was due to the disaster-prone nature of the region which is home to regular typhoons, floods, and earthquakes (Salter 1970: 64).

During this same period, large numbers of Chinese were encouraged to move into the region with the opening of two large sugar factories. The first, near Taidong, was built in 1913, and the second in the north was built in 1920 (Salter 1970: 65; Thorne 1997: 113). The Taidong Exploitation Corporation was established in 1920 with the goal of bringing in 1,300 settlers within the next four years. These settlers entered into contracts with the sugar corporation which guaranteed the factories a steady supply of raw materials and the farmers a guaranteed market for their produce, as well as technical assistance and fertilizer. The settlers were also expected to take part in military campaigns against the Aborigines (Salter 1970: 64-65).

Most of these military campaigns were against the Mountain Aborigines (such as the Bunun and the Truku), but Japanese land policies also caused friction with the Amis in the plains. The Japanese had declared that all land not under cultivation was officially state property (Stainton 1995: 95). Because much of the land that had belonged to the Amis during

the Qing era had not been converted to paddy land, and because there existed no written documentation to prove it belonged to the Amis, much of it was taken by the state. Even though the Japanese had offered the Amis a chance to register their land starting in 1915, many Amis were reluctant to do so because it would then require them to pay taxes on the newly registered land (Stainton 1995: 95-96; Thorne 1997: 130).⁵

While settlers were coming from Japan and the West Coast, the Japanese were also forcibly moving Mountain Aborigines into the area along the outer edges of the Central Range, which included the periphery of the Rift Valley.

Between 1903 and 1939 some 23% of the total Aborigine population moved. Since Pangcah [Amis]⁶ formed the largest single Aborigine group, and since they were relatively unaffected by forced removal, the percentage of the mountain population which was displaced must have been very much higher. (Thorne 1997: 129f)

Decades of using Plains Aborigines to fight those in the mountains (both under the Qing and the Japanese) had already affected relations between the groups, and the forced contact brought about by these settlement policies further exacerbated these tensions. Moreover, the newly settled Mountain Aborigines did not take well to wet-rice agriculture (Thorne 1997: 129). This transition was deeply disruptive to the entire social organization of the Bunun, since it introduced the concept of private ownership of land, thus undermining traditional patrilineal relationships (Stainton 1995: 100).

Goto Shimpei 後藤新平 (1857-1921), who held the post of civilian administrator from 1898 to 1906, held a social Darwinian view of ethnic relations, but he opposed those who believed that the Aborigines should simply be placed in a “a permanent reservation for them ‘until they died out’” (Thorne 1997: 123-124). Instead, he argued that gradual assimilation

was possible. While he did not establish formal "reservations" along the United States model, the Japanese government under Goto did build "an armed 'guard line' around most of the central mountain core of the island" (Thorne 1997: 123).⁷ He also set up an assimilation program to train young Aborigines (Thorne 1997: 123-124). However, just five years after Goto's departure, his gradualist policies were overturned in favor of a more aggressive military intervention that would allow for state and private companies to profit from the exploitation of both the forests (for camphor) and "possible mineral wealth" in the Aborigine territory (Thorne 1997: 125). By 1915, resistance in all but 122 Mountain Aborigine villages had been crushed. The long war had cost the Japanese colonial forces nearly 10,000 lives, while an untold number of Aborigine lives were lost through both warfare and starvation (Thorne 1997: 126-127).

Although the Mountain Aborigines were, through this violent process eventually incorporated into the state, the manner of their inclusion exacerbated the differences between them and the Chinese, as well as with the Plains Aborigines in the East. The Mountain Aborigines were taught at police stations around the guard line that kept them out of the region where Hakka workers were growing camphor. Police were the primary contact Aborigines had with the Japanese state, and the police fulfilled many important administrative functions. In 1931, over 5,000 patrolmen (nearly half of the entire police force) were stationed in Aborigine areas, most of these were Chinese guards (*keitei* 警丁) who did not have the same status as Japanese policemen (Chen 1984: 229).

Police run schools in Aborigine areas were still rather insignificant before the war began in 1937. For the most part they did little more than teach the Japanese language to children of the Aborigine leaders (Thorne 1997: 134). While Mountain Aborigines received only the most basic education from the police, some Amis were able to attend full fledged schools that

had been set up in the valley. As it had been under the Qing, attendance was a problem, and by 1907 only around 100 students had managed to graduate from these schools. In the early 1920s, when Taiwan's first civilian Governor-General temporarily scaled back the role of the police force, there was a brief spurt during which over thirty primary schools were established for the Mountain Aborigines, but by 1935 there were only five remaining (Chen 1984: 217; Thorne 1997: 134).

The curriculum at these schools continued to consist of little more than Japanese language classes, some arithmetic, “and perhaps music, manual training and agriculture” (Thorne 1997: 134). Like the Dutch and the Qing before them, the Japanese believed that a lifestyle devoted to agriculture would result in less violence, and to that end they sought to encourage the Aborigines “to switch from firearms to peaceful agricultural implements” (Chen 1984: 229). The Japanese had a fair measure of success at promoting the shift to wet rice agriculture. “Under police direction, the aborigines tripled their rice yield and more than doubled their acreage in seven years, from 1924 to 1931” (Chen 1984: 229).

The massacre of 134 Japanese by Seediq (*Saidekezu* 賽德克族) Aborigines on October 27, 1930, in what is now referred to as the Wushe Incident (*Wushe Shijian* 霧社事件), shattered illusions that the Mountain Aborigines had become willing Japanese subjects. The leader of the rebellion was Mona Rudao 莫那魯道 (1882-1930), who was one of many Aborigine leaders who had been taken on tours of Japan in order to impress them with the power and superiority of the Japanese state (Stainton 1995: 102-103).⁸ Equally shocking was the suicide of “two distinguished aborigine police, Dakkisnabin [拉奇斯·諾敏 (1908-1930)] and Dakkisnau [拉奇斯·那威 (-1930)] ... who were lauded as symbols of Japanese colonial benevolence and tutelage” (Ching 2000: 798). They took their lives rather than “forewarning the authorities or persuading the rebels to surrender” (Ching 2000: 798). The practice of

taking Aborigines on tours of Taiwan and Japan, a continuation of Qing era policies, was regularly done whenever Aborigine groups had been defeated in battle (Thorne 1997: 138). But it was ended in 1930, soon after the Wushe incident (Stainton 1995: 103).

Although there were a few isolated Aborigine uprisings in the following years,⁹ the Wushe Incident was a watershed for the establishment of Japanese control over the Aborigine population. Afterwards, for the most part, the Japanese could count on the cooperation of local leaders. Amongst the Amis this meant the toumu. “The job of tomok [toumu]¹⁰ was made a lifetime one and he was given great authority within the village to carry out the will of the police” (Thorne 1997: 132). The toumu were also picked to go on tours of Japan. In exchange, the toumu were responsible for the behavior of the people in their village, in a way that was similar to the Japanese re-implementation of the Qing era *baojia* (保甲, *hoko* in Japanese) in the Chinese areas. This included a form of corvée labor that was regularly expected of the Aborigines. But despite their power at the local level, the Aborigine elite were not able to get the same degree of education as Taiwanese did at the same time. By 1940, only eighteen Aborigines had graduated from secondary school in Taiwan (Thorne 1997: 135). Although there were limitations on the ability of Chinese to attend post secondary school, there were still a large number that managed to become teachers, doctors, or to even attend university in Japan.

Christianity did not yet play an important role in the mountains or the East Coast during the Japanese era. Even though missionaries were allowed to continue their activities after the Japanese gained control of the island in 1895 (at least up until the start of the Sino-Japanese War), they were unable to make any headway into the Aborigine territories. Warfare, and probably a desire to keep outsiders from observing the treatment of Aborigines, led the Japanese to restrict missionary access “on the grounds that they did not want the missionaries

to interfere with the aborigine ‘primitive beliefs’” (Richardson 1972: 161). Even so, there were a few Aborigine converts from the cities on the West Coast who were able to “spread the faith” on their own in areas unreachable by western missionaries (Richardson 1972: 162), and in 1930 a True Jesus church was established in Hualian along with a congregation in Taidong a few years later (Rubinstein 1991: 23). This limited exposure, together with the experiences of Aborigine prisoners of war who were exposed to Christianity, would make Aborigines even more receptive to foreign missionaries in the fifties and sixties.

WAR AND THE KOMINKA MOVEMENT, 1936-1945

Primary education continued to develop apace, getting a boost when the Sino-Japanese War broke out in 1937 and Japan sought to integrate its colony more closely into the empire. In the 1930s police run schools grew significantly in both size and number:

The number of children attending the police-administered and -taught schools increased from 6,887 in 1931 to 10,355 in 1942, and the percentage of school-age children registered in all schools, including about 50 regular primary schools which had slightly more than 7,000 aboriginal pupils, rose from 60.23 percent to 86.35 percent. (Chen 1984: 230)

Public education was also expanded, and by 1942 nearly sixty-five percent of the school aged population, and more than half of the females, were in school (Tsurumi 1984: 291). Nor were Japanese efforts at instilling Japanese cultural values through education limited to Aborigine children, a number of programs also targeted the adult population. Social groups and evening language classes were organized to reach adults, purportedly with some success (Chen 1984: 230). In many ways Aborigines, at least in official wartime discourse, were to become the ideal Japanese subjects and to serve as a model for Taiwan’s Chinese population. Some even

claimed that the “aborigines were more Japanized than were the Chinese” (Chen 1984: 229).

With the outbreak of war the Japanese launched the *Kominka* 皇民化 Movement — literally, a movement for the “imperialization of subject people” — aimed to create greater loyalty to the emperor through a number of policies, including language and education reforms (Tai 1999: 517). The two most important Kominka era language policies consisted of inducements for families to adopt Japanese manners and speech. These were the “National Language Family” (*kokugo katei* 國語家庭) program started in 1937, and the “Name Changing Campaign” (*kai-seimai* 改姓名) started in 1940 (Chou 1991). For the Chinese, designation of a family as a one that spoke the national language was a privilege, not a requirement. The Japanese colonial administration dolled out this particular form of Japanese cultural capital as a means of buying off the elite. It carried a number of significant benefits and privileges (Chou 1991: 78), but the conditions for gaining certification were quite stringent. For instance, families were evaluated for “the extent to which they had been Japanized in religion, clothing, and daily life” (Fong 1993: 121). Similarly, to be allowed to adopt a Japanese name (and thus assume certain privileges¹¹ associated with it) Chinese had to apply as a family group, registered under the name of the family-head. Furthermore, the family had to be a “family in which the national language was frequently used,” and they had to have demonstrated an enthusiastic commitment to becoming Japanese (Chou 1991: 115-117).

These policies were applied very differently among the Aborigines. For instance, for Aborigines name change was adopted on an individual, rather than family basis, making it much easier for educated Aborigines to meet the requirements (Chou 1991: 153-154). In some cases it seems that all that was required, was for the Aborigines to be able to read their Japanese names, as in the collective name-changing of 12,000 young Aborigine men in 1942 (Chou 1991: 154).¹² There were, however, some restrictions placed on the Aborigines, at least

at first, whose “Japanese Names” were only allowed to be quasi-Japanese as they were forbidden to use common Japanese surnames (Fong 1993: 120).¹³

As the war progressed, Taiwanese were mobilized to help fight. At first Taiwanese were not put directly into armed service, but starting in 1938 they were encouraged to volunteer to be porters, interpreters, and agricultural workers (Chou 1991: 171). Some enthusiastic volunteers signed declarations in blood declaring their desire to serve the Emperor, at least two of these Blood Pleas were written by Aborigines (Chou 1991: 168-170). Three years later, an island-wide Military Volunteers Program (*rikugun tokubetsu shiganhei* 陸軍特別志願兵) was established, and the response was so overwhelming that by 1942 425,921 Taiwanese had applied for only 1,000 available posts (Chou 1991: 178). Those selected had to pass written tests in Japanese language, Japanese history, and even mathematics (Chou 1991: 177). It was believed by the Japanese that Aborigines were particularly well suited for forest and mountain fighting, and special Aboriginal Volunteers Corps (*takasago giyuutai* 高砂義勇隊) were organized for this reason. By 1943, six such groups had been organized and sent to fight in Southeast Asia (Chou 1991: 195-196).

The sacrifices Aborigines were willing to make for the Japanese emperor were encapsulated in the tale of one young girl. In 1938, Sayon Hayun (莎勇) (1921-1938), a seventeen year-old Atayal (*Taiyazu* 泰雅族) woman from eastern Taiwan, lost her life while carrying three large suitcases on her back as she helped an officer departing for the war to leave the mountains (Ching 2000: 810).

In the spring of 1941, after learning of Sayon’s good deed (*zenko*), Governor- General Hasegawa Kiyoshi [長谷川 清 (1883-1970)] presented the Ryohen settlement with a bell inscribed with the following phrase: “The Bell of the Patriotic Maiden Sayon.”

The commemoration reverberated throughout the island, especially among the

aborigines, and generated a media sensation with a number of paintings of Sayon, a popular song, and eventually a film based on her story. (Ching 2000: 810)

Leo Ching argues that the power of Sayon's story lies not in a Pocahontas-like narrative of assimilation, but in Sayon's "extraordinary dedication to die performing her duty as an *ordinary* subject of the empire" (emphasis in original Ching 2000: 812). However, after finally gaining some limited recognition as Japanese subjects, the turning over of Taiwan to Chiang Kai-shek's (蔣介石) (1887-1975) forces after the war was to set back any gains made by these sacrifices, since Chiang's forces viewed loyalty to the Japanese with suspicion.

CONCLUSION: THE COLONIAL LEGACY AND THE KMT

With the first large-scale efforts to exert state control over Aborigines territory in 1874, Taiwan's Aborigines began a slow process of integration into the nation-state. But this process of integration was an uneven one: both geographically and temporally. Military control over the mountain areas contrasted with more conciliatory gestures along the East Coast. And funding for schools coming in fits and starts, resulting in schools closing a few years after they opened. Under the Japanese there was some rudimentary education provided at schools run out of the police stations along the mountain guard line, but it was only with the start of the Sino-Japanese war that public schooling began to be available on a large scale. A full discussion of how these Aborigine policy was affected by the arrival of the Kuomintang (國民黨 KMT) in 1948 is beyond the scope of this paper; nevertheless, it is worth briefly mentioning some of the ways in which KMT policy either continued or departed from colonial era trends.

The KMT established the Mountain Reserve Policy (*Taiwansheng gexian shandi baoliudi guanlibanfa* 台灣省各縣山地保留地管理辦法) which "continued the Japanese programme of

paddy rice promotion and movement of villages to more accessible areas” (Stainton 1995: 109). And the 1950s saw a marked increase in access to basic education, with over 144 elementary schools established by 1951 (Thorne 1997: 159). Confucian values once again became the hallmark of integration as the KMT sought to "resuscitate elements of the past" even as they invented new traditions (Chun 1994: 54). Yet these seeming continuities were undercut by the arrival of Christian missionaries. The Chiang family had secured support in the US for their leadership of so-called “free China” with the help of Christian organizations who had long been frustrated in their dream of converting the Chinese (Kerr 1965: 24,357). In less than ten years after the KMT arrived in Taiwan, there was a meteoric rise in the number of missionaries, from 30 in 1950 to “seven hundred in 1957” (Kerr 1965: 413). Although unintended, the presence of the church was to have a profound impact on Aborigine cultural and political life. As had been the case during the Dutch and Japanese eras, the missionaries continued to emphasize reading the bible in the local languages, resulting in the first generation of Aborigine leaders to be literate in their own languages (Stainton 1995: 156-57; Wang 1995). In particular, the Presbyterian Church was to play an important role in the battle for indigenous rights in Taiwan (Stainton 1995).

Another important change was linguistic. Most Aborigines had acquired literacy for the first time in the Japanese language, but the use of Japanese was suppressed by the KMT who promoted Mandarin as the official language. All vestiges of the Japanese language were officially banned from public discourse, newspapers, magazines and classrooms in 1946 (Hsiau 1997: 306). But these policies had mixed effects. Many older Aborigines continued to use Japanese in Church (Stainton 1995: 105). And government attempts to suppress the production of native language bibles were sporadic and of limited effectiveness (Stainton 1995: 156). On the other hand, as had been the case during the Japanese era, the

assimilationist policies of the KMT were to have a significant impact on Aborigine school children.

When doing fieldwork in a predominantly Amis primary school between 2000 and 2001 I was repeatedly told that just a few years earlier, before a new Amis school principle had been assigned to the school, few of the students would openly admit to being Aborigine. I also found marked differences and lingering divisions between the Amis community living in the plains, many of whom owned their own land, and the Bunun village which had been forcibly resettled from the mountains under the KMT (Friedman 2005: 213). It was these differences which compelled me to look back at the historical forces which have shaped contemporary Aborigine society. The temporal and geographic shifts discussed in this paper are sedimented in contemporary Aborigine society, with older people who still speak Japanese, younger ones who are monolingual in Mandarin, and a new generation who are endeavoring to once again learn their mother tongue. Differential experiences of the colonial encounter are perhaps also useful for understanding the recent phenomenon of ethnic certification, by which some Aborigine groups are challenging ethnic labels inherited from the Japanese era and seeking official recognition as distinct ethnic groups (Shih and Loa 2008).

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- 1 Parts of this chapter are adapted from (Friedman 2005)
- 2 In the 1990s indigenous activists in Taiwan led a campaign to change how they were referred to in official documents: "On anthropological advice, they created the new pan-ethnic name 'Aborigines' (*Yuanzhuamin* 原住民), that was supposed to replace the government-term 'mountain compatriots' and the commonly used terms 'savages' and 'mountain people'" (Rudolph 2002; see also: Ku 2005: 103). In capitalizing the word "Aborigine" I am following Melissa Brown, who does so to "indicate the equivalence between this term and 'Han' [Chinese] as ethnic designations" (Brown 2004: 251f). The uncapitalized form is retained when used in quotations.
- 3 See Chapter 3 of (Friedman 2005) for further discussion.
- 4 The Dutch did find some gold, which had been "collected by aborigines of eastern Taiwan, where it washed down rivers from the steep mountains" (Andrade 2008: 82), but "the amount of gold collected was small" {Andrade 2008@83}.
- 5 The failure to register land under the Japanese meant that much of this land would fall into government hands under the KMT.
- 6 "Pangcah" is another term for Amis. In the early eighteenth century the powerful Pyuma chieftain at Taidong declared his loyalty to the Dutch. This furthered the division between the Amis in the south of the Rift Valley, who were under Pyuma rule, and the Amis in the north of the valley who were not. The term "Amis" itself seems to be of Pyuma derivation, meaning "North" and refers to those southern Amis who were just North of the Pyuma, while the northern Amis are often referred to instead as "Pangcah" (Thorne 1997: 25-26f).
- 7 The area within the guard line was, "over a period of 20 years, moved ... inwards against the continual armed resistance of Mountain Aborigine groups (Thorne 1997: 123).
- 8 From "1898 to 1929 there were 9 tours involving 337 people" (Stainton 1995: 103).
- 9 Such as the Daguanshan Incident (*Daguanshan Shijian* 大關山事件) of 1932.
- 10 Tomok is Amis for toumu.
- 11 In general, they were to be treated by policemen as the equals of ethnic Japanese. Educationally, their children were allowed to take the entrance examinations for high schools which formerly admitted only Japanese students. Economically, during times of rationing they were granted more food than their fellow countrymen who stuck to Chinese names (Chou 1991: 157).
- 12 This is quite significant compared with the numbers for Chinese. By 1943 only 17,526 families (or 126,211 individuals out of a population of over six million) had changed their names (Chou 1991: 128; population estimate from Huang 1995).
- 13 The Chinese, on the other hand, were allowed to take Japanese surnames as long as they were not the names of "emperors," "famous personalities" (historical or contemporary), or "surnames indicating the geographical origins of former Chinese names" (which was feared to promote place-of-origin based ethnic rivalries like those in the nineteenth century) (Chou 1991: 123-124).